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a b s t r a c t
This article takes an ecological approach to the functioning of self-organised cognitive systems. The
dynamics of such systems are traced to how they are animated by agents through interactivity, or sense-
saturated agent-environment coordination. These dynamics give rise to cognitive events, the nature of
which is revealed with detailed micro level qualitative analyses which, in turn, unveil unique cognitive
trajectories in a problem landscape. The article presents and exempliﬁes a method for doing so, the
Cognitive Event Analysis. This method is based on a “probatonic principle” that prompts cognitive sci-
entists to pay close attention to ﬁne-grained particulars in human behaviour. Based on the methodo-
logical approach and two case studies, the article discusses how affordances and language function in a
cognitive ecology.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In early 2014, 50 participants were given a problem-solving task
in the Systemic Cognition Lab at Kingston University (Steffensen,
Vallee-Tourangeau, & Vallee-Tourangeau, submitted; Vallee-
Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallee-Tourangeau, & Makri, 2015). The
participants were given the so-called 17 Animals problem in one of
two conditions (using pen and paper, or using a physical model),
just as they underwent a series of psychometric measures. The
experiment was designed to determine how differences in the
physical layout of the problem presentation affects behavioural
outcomes and success rates. The statistical results suggested that a
physical model does in fact facilitate a successful outcome (Vallee-
Tourangeau et al., 2015), which is not surprising if one takes recent
work on cueing into account (e.g. Ball & Litchﬁeld, 2013; Kirsh,
2009). By determining whether a participant had reached a solu-
tion or not within the time limit, it was shown that participants in
the “physical model” condition perform far better than chance
performance, while subjects in the “pen and paper” condition
perform much worse. So far, so good. But here comes a surprising
insight: the 50 participants were all video-recorded during their
performance, and even a ﬁrst glance at the videos revealed that the
uniform group of “successful solvers” in fact covered a substantial
variability in the way that they used the physical model. This sur-
prising variability was undetected in the initial measurement and
would thus never have reached the surface without the additional
analysis of the video-recordings. Obviously, one's measurement
methods constrain what one can ﬁnd, but one may wonder, how
many experiments would have exhibited similar variability, had the
measurement methods allowed for it.
Variability can be utterly trivial. For instance, whether a subject
solves the Tower of Hanoi problem using his/her left or right hand
(or whether the disks are red, blue, or green) hardly matters; such
questions are hardly worth any scientiﬁc investigation. But how
does one a priori distinguish between cognitively relevant and
irrelevant variability? Given the usual methodological assumptions
of cognitive science, the obvious way forward is to advance a set of
experimentally testable hypotheses. However, while cognitive sci-
ence has developed robust methods for testing hypotheses, the
ﬁeld is surprisingly silent when it comes to its methods for
generating hypotheses.1 In the absence of explicit procedures for
E-mail address: s.v.steffensen@sdu.dk.
1 For instance, a search on PsycINFO gives 1979 hits for “test(ing) or evaluat(ing)
hypothesis/-es” within cognitive psychology, but only 149 hits for “generat(ing),
creat(ing) or produc(ing) hypothesis/-es” within this ﬁeld (Steffensen et al.,
submitted).
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generating hypotheses, the ﬁeld has to rely on anecdotal hypoth-
eses, or hypotheses derived from theoretical arguments.
In this paper, I argue, that what is missing is an inductive
method for observing cognitive performance and behavioural
particulars, both in real-life and in the lab. On the one hand, such a
method complements the standard inventory of methods in
cognitive science, as it generates hypotheses on a principled basis
and with a starting point in empirical work. On the other, slightly
more radical hand, such a method goes one step further by com-
plementing the nomothetic enterprise with an idiographic frame-
work. In both variants, the argument builds on a methodological
principle called the Probatonic Principle; this principle is introduced
in section 2. In section 3, the method, Cognitive Event Analysis, is
introduced, and section 4 demonstrates the kind of insights yielded
by such a ﬁne-grained qualitative method to human behaviour by
showcasing two examples. In section 5 I use the two case studies to
discuss how affordances are best conceptualised in an ecological
framework. Finally, in the discussion in section 6, I discuss the role
of language in human behaviour and the perennial topic of the
validity of idiographic approaches.
2. The probatonic principle
The approach presented in this paper builds on a methodolog-
ical principle that I call the probatonic principle, borrowing a term
from Luke 15,4e6:
Which one of you, having a hundred sheep and losing one of
them, does not leave the ninety-nine in the wilderness and go
after the one that is lost until he ﬁnds it? [ … ] And when he
comes home, he calls together his friends and neighbors, saying
to them, ‘Rejoice with me, for I have found my sheep [probaton
moy (probaton mou)] that was lost’. (Luke 15:4e6; New Revised
Standard Version; my italics and insertion of the Greek original)
The probatonic principle is named after the single sheep
(probaton in Greek) that has our full attention and which is not
reducible to being just a member of the herd e or of the dataset, as
it were. It acknowledges each participant as following his or her
own “microecological orbit” (Goffman, 1964), and thus takes a
starting point in a speciﬁc cognitive ecosystem (Vallee-Tourangeau
et al., 2015). As a research principle it states that much can be
gained from scrutinising single, particular instances in detail. The
probatonic principle urges us to study instances, either in their own
right or as part of a hypothesis-generating procedure. The princi-
ple's importance lies in the fact that it forces us to attend to small,
nonlinear (and at times one-off) phenomena that (also) impact on
behaviour.
The argument for this line of though is as follows. If we accept
the view that cognition is embodied, we must reject the assump-
tion that there is an inner bodily core that does the cognition: the
body is a systemic whole, and not a layered non-cognitive. This
view parallels Thelen and Smith's (1994:337) comment that “we,
like the symbolic computational theorist, view cognition as all one
kind; but in our view, it is all embodied, all distributed, all activity,
all a complex event in time.” At the very least, we must acknowl-
edge that if there is a cognitive core somewhere in a cognitive
system, it is sensitive to input from all other parts of the system.
Following this argument, there is no principled way of determining
what is, or can become, part of the cognitive system. Cognition
regulates the agent-environment relation, and all ingredients in the
agent-environment system potentially partake in this regulation.
Therefore, we have no a priori ways of determining what parts of
the systemwe should attend to. In contrast, experimental methods
rely on isolating and measuring variables. By necessity, a
measurement requires that the parameter to be measured is
determined a priori. Likewise, experimental methods require that
the variables are predetermined.
Given the probatonic principle, how do we study cognitive
particulars? The ecosystemic emphasis entails that, while the
uniqueness of particulars may appear as differences in peripheral
details, it is not reducible to such details. Thus, it makes little sense
to study speciﬁc details in isolation, without considering how they
contribute to a speciﬁc cognitive system. How this system is
deﬁned depends on the speciﬁc research question being asked.
Obviously, any investigation depends on some sort of delineation,
but the probatonic principle urges us to rely on inductive delinea-
tion where a given cognitive system is documented in as much
detail as possible, so that the delineation can be an a posteriori
procedure based on data, rather than an a priori procedure.
On a naturalised viewpoint, a cognitive system is ecological, and
as such it has an irreducible and irreproducible historical trajectory.
Studying cognitive particulars, thus, amounts to studying the
unique trajectory of a dynamical cognitive system. Evoking
Dynamical Systems Theory in this context is not incidental. Thus,
the emphasis on cognitive trajectories parallels Esther Thelen's
mountain stream metaphor for describing cognitive development:
I suggest another metaphor for human behavior: a mountain
stream. This is an apt comparison to keep in mind, because a
stream is moving all the time in continuous ﬂowand continuous
change. Development is continuousdwhatever has happened
in the past inﬂuences what happens in the future. But the
stream also has patterns. We can see whirlpools, eddies, and
waterfalls, places where the water is moving rapidly and places
where it is still. [… ] The patterns reﬂect not just the immediate
conditions of the stream, however; they also reﬂect the history
of the whole system, including the snowfall on the mountain
last winter, the conditions on the mountain last summer, and
indeed the entire geological history of the region, which deter-
mined the incline of the stream and its path through the
mountain. (Thelen, 2005:259)
Thelen focuses on the temporal scale of child development, but
the metaphor also supports the probatonic principle because it
urges us to study particulars in real-time behaviour. Just like
development is non-linear, so are real-life, on-line, cognitive
actioneperception cycles non-linear.
In the current context, the principal explanans for how the
ecological agent-environment relation is upheld and modiﬁed is
interactivity, here deﬁned as sense-saturated coordination that yields
functional results.2 Coordination takes place whenever a living
agent interacts with (conspeciﬁc, living, or non-living) entities in its
environment. In thewords of Kirsh (2006:250), “coordination is the
glue of distributed cognition”: embodied agents are physical-
material structures, and their actions are directed towards
physical-material structures in their ecology. However, it is a
peculiar fact about the human ecology that it is permeated by
(historically generated) symbolic and organisational structures that
extend our perceptual and actional domain. The human ecology is
an extended ecology (Steffensen, 2011), because sociocultural re-
sources (above all language) extend our range of action and
perception, not unlike how a spider's web functions as “a huge
extension of the effective catchment area of her predatory organs”
(Dawkins, 1982:192; quoted in Waters, 2012:509). The human
ecology extends by exploiting sense-making capacities: when we
2 This deﬁnition differs slightly from the one given in Steffensen (2013:196):
“sense-saturated coordination that contributes to human action.”
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avoid a bench because of a ‘Wet Paint’ sign, we use the (linguisti-
cally mediated) experiences of others to constrain our own
behaviour. Likewise, all human cultures exploit sense-making
processes to extend our biologically grounded distinction be-
tween edible and inedible (e.g. by dubbing certain food items ‘ha-
lal’, ‘kosher’, ‘delicious’, etc.), as well as our biological categorisation
of whom we may mate with and whom not. Since sense-making
occurs everywhere in the human ecology, our ecology is sense-
saturated, not unlike how blood, iron, and ﬂuid can be saturated
with oxygen, magneticity, and thermal energy. On the one hand,
sense-saturation implies that we need to take linguistic and so-
ciocultural dynamics into account when we investigate (living in)
the human ecology. On the other hand, the opposite also holds true:
we cannot study language and human socioculture without
considering how it impacts on the bio-ecological dynamics in
speciﬁc socioculturally extended ecologies. Accordingly, our object
of study is the sense-saturated human interactivity that unfolds in
an extended ecology permeated with symbolic structures. The aim
of such a study is to determine how sense-saturated coordination
enables human beings to achieve results (or cognitive outcomes) in
a complex socioculturally laden ecology. Given how interactivity
maintains the agent and the environment as a coupled system,
cognitive outcomes can neither be traced to an omnipotent agent
that acts on the environment, nor to a series of environmental
features that shape agent behaviour. Interactivity is self-organised
(Heylighen, 2001), and as such, there are no a priori ways of
determining whether the agent or the environment, or any sub-
system of either, has causal priority in determining behaviour: “it is
not possible to say what directly causes what, because the whole
system is so mutually embedded and interdependent” (Thelen,
2005:259). Hence, to identify stable patterns, one has to investi-
gate (the trajectory of) the cognitive probatonics of individual
agent-environment system.
3. Cognitive Event Analysis
Cognitive Event Analysis (CEA) is a method that complies with
the probatonic principle and which can be used in its own right, as
well as a hypothesis-generating procedure. Building on ﬁne-
grained scrutiny of video recordings of human behaviour in natu-
ral or experimental settings, CEA seeks to answer two foundational
questions: How are cognitive results achieved by cognitive sys-
tems? And how do human agents animate such cognitive systems?
In the context of this special issue, one can add a third question:
how does language contribute to generating results within a wider
(non-symbolic) ecological context?
While space limitations prohibit a full explication of the
method,3 CEA takes a starting point in the ecological claim that all
living systems must make “their way in the world” (Reed, 1996:11)
as a continuous behavioural and metabolic process of interactivity.
Accordingly, cognition is what enables organisms to regulate the
organism-environment relation in a ﬂexible and adaptive way that
serves the purpose of staying alive (and reproduce). Since cognition
can be traced to the organism-environment interface, it is a fallacy
to ascribe it to an individual organism. Rather, when it comes to
human cognising, one should start from a distributed cognitive
system (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000), that is “a self-organising
entity that arises as human beings co-engage through inter-
activity, and connect up brains, bodies and aspects of the
environment” (Steffensen, 2013:199e200). Human cognition,
therefore, is a collective achievement grounded in interactivity. Like
organisms, distributed cognitive systems “make their way in the
world,” and by so doing they deﬁne a cognitive trajectory. Such
trajectories, however, cannot per se be the object of study for a
science of cognitive probatonics. The reason is that they are open-
ended and thus unanalysable: all parts of a cognitive system have
their own unique trajectories, and what happens in a given
moment is the result of these multiple trajectories meshing in a
single point in time (Steffensen & Pedersen, 2014). To elaborate on
Thelen'smountain streammetaphor, a distributed cognitive system
ﬂows as a uniﬁcation of tributaries. The solution to this methodo-
logical problem is to segment a cognitive trajectory into delineated
cognitive events that can be investigated.
This segmentation procedure is observer-dependent and can be
based on purely functional criteria, because a cognitive system “is a
constellation of structures [ … ] involved in the performance of
some invariant task” (Hutchins, 1995:281). Thus, having deﬁned or
identiﬁed the task of the system, one can identify points in time
where the system accomplishes the task, fails to accomplish the
task, breaks down before having accomplished the task, etc. Thus,
the key to segment a cognitive trajectory is the identiﬁcation of the
cognitive result, deﬁned in relation to the task that in the ﬁrst place
deﬁned the cognitive system. Thus, as Giere (2004:771) makes
clear, “a distributed cognitive system is a system that produces
cognitive outputs, just as an agricultural system yields agricultural
products.” Paraphrasing Reed, we can say that just as cognition is all
about organisms ﬁnding their way in the world, so is the cognitive
result the way found by the organisms.
Accordingly, CEA adopts Timo J€arvilehto's sound methodolog-
ical principle for studying cognition: “the research should start
from the determination of the results of behaviour and lead to the
necessary constituents of the living system determining the
achievement of these results” (J€arvilehto, 2009:118). Hence, a
cognitive event is a sequence of ﬂexible, adaptive behaviour that
constitutes the cognitive results identiﬁed by the observer. Again,
Thelen's mountain stream metaphor is helpful. Waterfalls and
standstills segment the stream into distinct phases, not unlike how
development and evolution take the shape of punctuated equilibria
(Gould, 1989). Along the cognitive trajectory, small-scale, idiosyn-
cratic changes and variations are picked up by the system, ampli-
ﬁed through processes of positive feedback, turned into affordances
for solving the problem, and exploited in the current cognitive
activity. In CEA, such a point along the trajectory is a transition point
where the system undergoes a phase transition, for instance a
recalibration (where the system recruits or expels one or more
parts), a behavioural change (where the system for instance neu-
tralises its previous attempts and starts all over), or a perturbation
(where the system reacts to e or fails to react to e external in-
ﬂuences). Such transition points are central in CEA, but some are
more central than others. Such central or decisive transition points
are called event pivots in CEA. An event pivot is a phase transition
that is necessary for the event to take place. For instance, in
problem-solving psychology e as will be elaborated in the
following section e cognitive systems are often operating under
one or more false constraints, which lead them to an impasse
where they cannot solve the problem. In such examples, two
transition points are crucial: ﬁrst, the cognitive system must
overcome an impasse (the primary event pivot), and second it must
reach a solution based on the insight (the secondary event pivot).
While the latter is rather trivial, the former is challenging: how
does a cognitive system move beyond a point where it is func-
tionally ﬁxated on a wrong premise?
To sum up, CEA is a method of cognitive probatonics: it studies
cognitive trajectories by segmenting them into delineated cognitive
3 For a detailed presentation and discussion of the method, readers are referred
to Cowley and Nash (2013), Lassiter (In press), Pedersen and Steffensen (2014),
Steffensen (2013), Steffensen, Vallee-Tourangeau, and Vallee-Tourangeau
(submitted).
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events that are brought forth through a sequence of cognitive phase
transitions. Some of these transitions are pivotal for the achieve-
ment of a cognitive result, and these are accordingly called event
pivots. The trajectory is modelled as in the (generic) Fig. 1, which
visualises the trajectory, the event, the phase transitions, and the
event pivots.
Although CEA accords with the probatonic principle and thus
promotes a single-case approach, it can still generate valid gener-
alisations. Thus, with CEA it is possible to develop a typology of
cognitive events, based on the conﬁguration of transition points
and event pivots within and across cases. For instance, the
problem-solving examples discussed here and elsewhere (e.g.
Steffensen & Pedersen, 2014) seem consistently to be constituted
by a cognitive trajectory where an extended period of multiple
cycles of repetitive behaviour (each demarcated by a transition
point) is interrupted by a sudden behavioural shift (a primary event
pivot) which shortly after leads to another sudden shift (a sec-
ondary event pivot) at which point in time the problem-solving
behaviour ceases. Such a generalised description further suggests
that the pre-pivot cycles contain small behavioural modiﬁcations
that in a nonlinear fashion bring about the large-scale behavioural
change that most problem-solving psychologists identify as an aha
moment.
4. Two cognitive ecosystems
In the remainder of this article, I discuss two case studies of
cognitive ecosystems engaged in problem-solving. The two cogni-
tive systems follow cognitive trajectories that exhibit cyclicity and
phase transitions, toward a cognitive event which is deﬁned as the
achievement of a cognitive result, namely the solution of the
problem. In both cases the solution is preceded by unsuccessful
attempts at solving it, and the solution manifestly depends on
overcoming an impasse.
The ﬁrst case (from Steffensen, 2013) comes from a real-life
setting in a Danish company. Two ofﬁce workers e known as
Black andWhitee struggle to ﬁgure out why the company's invoice
system does not add the required Company Identiﬁcation Number
(called “the CVR number”) to the printed invoices. In their ﬁrst
attempts to solve the problem, they assume an implicit constraint
namely that the missing number is caused by a malfunction in the
computer software; hence, apart from blaming the software pro-
grammers, they try to solve the problem by feeding the number
into the computer. But suddenly it dawns upon them that the CVR
number is in fact pre-printed on the company's logo paper; hence,
simply choosing another printer tray in the computer's printer
setup menu solves their problem. But how did they come to this
realisation?
The second case is Cowley and Nash (2013) semi-naturalistic
study of a young air cadet (“Billy”). As part of his military
training, Billy is given the river-crossing task (a.k.a “the mis-
sionaries and cannibals problem”), cf. Metcalfe and Wiebe (1987)
and Guthrie, Vallee-Tourangeau, Vallee-Tourangeau, and Howard
(2015). In this version, the problem is tailored to Billy's military
training: his task is to transport three “good guys” (“air cadets” (A)
in this military setting) and three “bad guys” (“pongos” (P) in the
setting) across a river in 5 min, using a raft that carries two persons,
and which cannot move across the river on its own. A further
constraint is that the pongos may not outnumber the air cadets on
any bank (in this setting, those on the raft are not counted). Billy is
solving the problem using a physical model. His ofﬁcer is present in
the room, which incidentally prompts him to speak aloud about his
reasoning. The tricky point emerges when Billy has moved 1 A and
1 P to the far bank. Logically, Billy can make six different moves at
this stage4:
½AAjA ½AAjP ½APjA ½APjP ½PPjA ½PPjP
Two of these moves, [PPjA] and [PPjP], obviously violate the
outnumbering constraint. Of the four remaining moves, one sticks
out, namely [AAjP], as this is the only move where the raft is driven
back to the home bank by a ﬁgure not driving it to the far bank.
Nearly all solvers, Billy included, initially constructs a false
“ferryman constraint” which requires that one ﬁgure acts as a
ferryman that takes one passenger (A or P) to the other bank and
returns, either to take another passenger or to be replaced by
another ferryman.5 Under this constraint, the problem cannot be
solved; it has to be relaxed in order to allow for the felicitous move
[AAjP] where the ferryman A is replaced by P on the far bank. Only
few solvers manage to do so, and Billy is one of them. But how did
he do it?
4.1. Black and White's cognitive trajectory
The main insight in this section is that cognitive results depend
on patterns of interactivity, patterns that are as unique as the
agent's ﬁngerprint. Interactivity, or sense-saturated coordination,
ﬂows as actioneperception cycles between cognitive agents and
their environment, and it allows agents to engage in, not recon-
structive problem-solving, but in performative solution-probing.
Reconstructive problem-solving applies when participants in
problem-solving analyse the emergence of the problem by making
a step-by-step reconstruction of how to solve a task. Such a
reconstruction would have taken Black and White to the print
menu, including the printer tray selection, and thus they would
Fig. 1. A generic cognitive trajectory. The black arrows depict the cognitive trajectory, interspersed with a number of phase transition points (unﬁlled triangles) that deﬁne a number
of sequences or cycles along the trajectory. Some of the phase transitions have a functionally deﬁned status as event pivots (ﬁlled triangles).
4 Square brackets indicate a roundtrip move. Those travelling to the far bank are
indicated before the vertical line; after the line, those sailing back to the home bank
is indicated.
5 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, an alternative formulation of this
constraint is that a ﬁgure that has already been brought across cannot be returned
to the original side, as this is, literally, a counterintuitive drawback in the problem-
solving. Other versions of the river crossing problem do in fact require that the
ferryman takes one passenger back to the original side, and certainly this alterna-
tive formulation of the implicit constraint applies to this scenario. In Cowley and
Nash's version, however, no move that requires two ﬁgures to travel back is needed.
Hence, there is no way of determining which of the two constraint formulations
applies to Billy.
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have been confronted with the difference between their actual
choice of paper and the correct choice of paper for sending out the
invoice to a customer. In contrast, performative solution-probing
emerge when cognitive agents engage in actioneperception cy-
cles in a way where affordances for problem-solving are procured.
The agents probe the environment in order to detect felicitous
solutions. To demonstrate how interactive solution-probing works
for Black andWhite, let us ﬁrst turn to their cognitive trajectory (cf.
Fig. 2).
The solution-probing shows in a cyclical interactivity pattern
where Black repetitively states what the problem is. He informs
White three times that the current invoice cannot be paid; in the
ﬁrst two cycles he even opens with the same formulation: men jeg
kan fortælle dig … (eng. But I can tell you …), uttered at 45,000
and 18,625 in the cognitive trajectory (Fig. 3). But in the third
cycle, Black's wordings have changed, although content-wise he
“says the same:”
1. Hvis det var mig så røg den bare hen i stakken. (0.7)
2. Den kan jeg ikke betale. (0.4)
3. Hvorfor kan jeg ikke det? (0.8)
4. Der er ikke noget CVR nummer på. (0.9)
5. Du må ikke sende en faktura uden CVR nummer (0.4)
1. If it were me then it just went in the pile (0.7)
2. I can't pay that. (0.4)
3. Why can't I pay it? (0.8)
4. There is no CVR number on it. (0.9)
5. You can't send an invoice without a CVR number. (0.4)
As argued in Steffensen (2013), Black creates a counterfactual
narrative by using the formulation hvis det var mig … (if it were me
Fig. 2. Black and White's cognitive trajectory. The primary event pivot emerges when White utters the solution to the problem. The secondary event pivot emerges when Black
initiates a narrative that reframes their problem.
Fig. 3. Black's embodiment of the invoice receiver. As Black initiates his counterfactual narrative with the formulation hvis det var mig så røg den bare hen i stakken, he lifts the
invoice (4a), drops it (4b), catches it again (4c), and throws it into a pile of papers at the far end of table (4d); in 4d, the invoice is marked with a red circle. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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…). Within the scope of the narrative, Black (and by implication also
White) sees the situation from the point of view of a virtual agent,
namely the receiver of the invoice. The force of the narrative is so
strong that it recalibrates the deictic system, as jeg (I) in line 2 and 3
does not refer to the speaker, but to the virtual, narrated receiver of
the invoice. Thus, Black andWhite probe for solutions by seeing the
problem from another relevant point of view: that of the invoice
receiver. Crucially, what the receiver receives is an invoice printed
on logo paper.
However, Black not only narrates the receiver, he also enacts
him. Thus, as illustrated in Fig. 3, and documented in detail in Fig. 4,
when Black says the unstressed syllables hvis det var (if it were), he
lifts the invoice (Fig. 3a) and drops it (Fig. 3b). Further, when he
utters the stressed syllable mig (['mai], me), he catches the invoice
again (Fig. 3c) and throws it into a pile on table (Fig. 3d). His
narrative is thus complemented by a drop-catch-throw movement
through which Black embodies the virtual invoice receiver, as s/he
receives the invoice and throws it into a hypothetical pile of
unpayable invoices. Black thus narrates and embodies the invoice
receiver in a 1500 ms whole-bodied sequence. It is a crucial part of
this embodied narrative that Black uses the three stressed syllables
in line 1 to organise the manual enactment of the receiver's
handling of the invoice. Thus, as shown in Fig. 4, the receiving of the
invoice is synchronised with uttering the stressed syllable mig
(['mai], me); on the stressed syllable bare (['ba:], just), Black starts
his throwmovement; and on the stressed syllable stakken (['stagn],
the pile), he lets go of the paper that continues into a pile on his own
table. Through this solution-probing sequence, Black-as-sender
passes the invoice on to the-virtual-invoice-receiver-embodied-
by-Black. Furthermore, by throwing the invoice away, Black effec-
tively dissolves the ﬁxation bias prompted by the printed paper. In
turn, this reframing of the problem promptsWhite to come upwith
the solution right after Black's ﬁve consecutive utterances: nå nej,
men det er der jo hvis vi printer ud på logo papir (well no, but it [the
number] is there if we print on logo paper).
In summary, the cognitive result was achieved through Black's
repetitive framing of the problem, combined with his changing the
perspective to that of the invoice receiver. This change of perspective
was prompted by the narrative structure where Black told how he
would handle the blank paper invoice if he were the one who
received it. Crucially, this narrative was embodied by enacting the
receiver's handling of the invoice. In conclusion, neither mental
models nor linguistic reasoning, but themessy reality of interactivity
brought forth the cognitive event of solving the invoice problem.
4.2. Billy's cognitive trajectory
In the meantime, Billy is still struggling to get his air cadets
across the river, as shown in the cognitive trajectory in Fig. 5.
In the ﬁrst 34 s of the 4:15 min cognitive trajectory, Billy has
Fig. 4. The timing of Black and White's embodied interactivity before the primary event pivot. The top panel of the ﬁgure depicts their second cycle (cf. Fig. 2), from 19,000
to 8500; the middle panel their third cycle from 8500 to 0; the bottom panel the timing of Black's ﬁrst utterance in the third cycle, as well as his manual gestures (cf. Fig. 3). In
the two ﬁrst panels, there are four rows: the top row shows Black's gaze; the second row shows White's gaze; the third row Black's manual movements; the fourth row Black's
utterance. The red marking places Black's pivotal utterance on the cognitive trajectory. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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moved one A and one P to the far bank, using an A as ferryman. For
the ﬁrst time along the cognitive trajectory, Billy has run into what
Cowley and Nash (2013) call the reality point where the decisive
move is [AAjP], which requires that the ferryman constraint is
relaxed. Billy has not realized this yet, so for the next minute he
engages in reasoning. First, he launches a 20 s sequence of condi-
tional reasoning: If I take … this guy over there … I'm going to be
attacked… Second, he tries another strategy, namely to draw on his
military training: Should I divide my forces or … keep them
together? … Second trip I'll be adding reinforcements, ehm so …
This strategy makes him perform [AAj-]; however, the ofﬁcer ob-
jects: You can't do that ‘cos when you get to the other bank you're
outnumbered. Billy now returns to a trial-and-error strategy as he,
without further reasoning, says I'll xxx an air cadet down there and
moves [AAjA]. In reaction, the ofﬁcer is outspoken: he's out-
numbered. Billy now resets the game: I'll start again, moving all
ﬁgures to the home bank (cf. the dotted square at 1:55 in Fig. 5). For
the second time, Billy opens with [APjA], and this time his ferryman
constraint is more outspoken, as he actually keeps an A on the raft
standing on the home bank, while he says: one pongo, moving P to
the far bank. Later in the same sequence, he changes the condi-
tional, but still not the implicit ferryman constraint: If I get the
pongo to drive the raft …
Billy is told he has 2 min left. As observed by Cowley and Nash
(2013:193), “Instead of being overwhelmed (or starting over),
Billy faces up to the reality checkpoint. He puckers his lips and
places his tongue in front of his lower teeth.” In this focused state,
Billy sequentially goes through the logically possible moves, as
shown in Fig. 6 (step 1e2): ﬁrst [xAjx] (i.e. [AAjA] or [PAjP]), then
[xPjx] (i.e. [APjA]).
Billy slows down. Unknowingly, by doing so he redeﬁnes a move
to be one trip over the river, rather than a roundtrip with the same
ferryman. This change allows Billy to focus on the home bank, and
in step 3 he realizes that [-jA] is illegal when there are two Ps on the
home bank. This realization is repeated in step 4. This is crucial,
because Billy has now honed in on the problem: it emerges when
an A is brought back e hence, a P must be brought back (step 5).
While it looks like an exercise in disembodied, conditional
reasoning, it is far from the case. Rather, Billy relies on his gaze
moving back and forth between the two banks and on his ﬁngers
pointing to, and touching, the ﬁgures. A remarkable change appears
in step 4: while logically Billy repeats the conditional in step 3, his
embodiment is different, as he now accompanies the move with a
manual gesture from bank to bank. Effectively, this embodiment
individuates the move to the home bank, and hence dissolves the
implicit ferryman constraint. As his hand makes the move back,
Billy's gaze stays at the far bank: he thus integrates a manual move
back and a gaze selection of one of the ﬁgures on the far bank. This
embodied constellation leads Billy right to the event pivot, as he in
step 5 utters pongo come back. The ungrammatical construction
indicates how he in fact integrates the two movements (i.e.
pointing out the pongo and making a move back). Thus, the
wording in step 5 is accompanied by a composite left hand
movement: on pongo, he points to (the pongo on) the far bank, and
on come back, he makes a sweeping hand movement towards the
home bank. While this is indeed the solution to the problem, it
takes Billy a moment to realize that this is the case, and having done
so, he summarises the solution: So I take my two air cadets over and I
change them … This guy for a pongo … move him back.
In summary, Billy reached a solution through his embodied
interactivity with the physical model. His interactivity includes
verbal patterns that endow his movement with a layer of condi-
tional reasoning. Crucially, slowing down the actioneperception
cycles that constitute his interactivity led him to individuate the
moves, and thus he dissolved the implicit ferryman constraint.
5. Affordances as thick relations: or how cognitive systems
are animated
Information computational processing models often build on
the assumption that cognition is a stepwise process from an initial
state to an end goal. While such models may be compatible with
observed behaviour, they certainly do not explain it. Amongst other
problems, they fall prey to the computationalist fallacy that a path
automatically creates a journey. They thus ignore what prompts a
cognitive agent to take the next step in the model. In particular,
computationalist models fail to explain how cognitive agents move
beyond impasses. If there is no obvious next step in the
Fig. 5. Billy's cognitive trajectory. The primary event pivot emerges when Billy realises that the solution lies in making a pongo drive the raft back (pongo come back). The secondary
event pivot is deﬁned by the ofﬁcer's utterance 2 min left, as this prompts Billy to focus on the conditional reasoning between the two pivots. Vertical lines along the trajectory
designate moves that are indicated over the lines (cf. footnote 3). Dotted areas designate neutralisation of one or more moves. Reasoning styles are indicated below the cognitive
trajectory.
Fig. 6. Billy's conditional reasoning between the two event pivots. Billy's utterances
are rendered in black; the hypothetical moves of the conditional reasoning are
rendered in red. Blue boxes indicate Billy's gazing at the far bank; pink boxes indicate
his touching the ﬁgures mentioned by him; green boxes indicate him pointing at a
ﬁgure; and yellow boxes indicate him enacting a movement from one bank to the
other. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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computational model, we should expect the system to come to an
apathetic halt. However, when faced with the impasse, Billy, Black,
and White all keep going.
In comparison, classical ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979;
Hodges, 2014; Reed, 1996) traces progress along the cognitive tra-
jectory to the affordances of environment: “affordances and only
the relative availability (or nonavailability) of affordances create
selection pressure on the behaviour of individual organisms; hence
behaviour is regulated with respect to the affordances of the
environment for a given animal” (Reed, 1996:18). However, Billy,
Black and White all reside in a stable environment with nearly no
changes in the layout of affordances. According to Reed's classic
formulation, a stable layout of affordances entails a stable set of
selection pressures, which in turn, ceteris paribus, should mean that
the behaviour is stable too. But in the two case studies, behaviour is
far from stable, so behaviour must be regulated with respect to
something else than affordances. This classic ecological model lacks
an explanation of how an agent exerts adaptive, ﬂexible behaviour
in a stable layout of affordances. To solve this problem, the rela-
tional turn in ecological psychology (Chemero, 2003, 2011) has
contributed with an alternative understanding of affordances as
“relations between particular aspects of animals and particular
aspects of situations” (Chemero, 2003:184). According to this
model, changes in the layout of affordances need not emerge in the
environment:
Most changes in relations between the abilities of animals and
environmental situations will be changes in environmental
situations. [ … ] [But] there can also be changes in affordances
without changes in the features of the environment. The very
same stair no longer affords climbing to an individual whose
stepping abilities have decayed because of old age. (Chemero,
2003:192f.)
However, Chemero's model is in itself insufﬁcient for giving an
ecological explanation of the data presented here, because the two
examples play out on a timescale that is too fast (or too short) to
allow for substantial changes in the agents' abilities (or effectiv-
ities). To remedy this shortcoming, I suggest that the probatonic
principle is a key to understand the dynamics described.
By taking micro-ecological variability into account, the proba-
tonic principle implies that the affordance relation between the
agent and the environment is a “thick relation,” similar to Geertz'
(1973) “thick description.” A thick relation implies, ﬁrst, that it is
not the relation per se that constitutes the affordance, but rather the
iterative interactivity through which the agent upholds the rela-
tion, perceives environmental structures, and acts in the world.
Second, given its relational thickness, an affordance is nonlinear,
dynamical and inherently unstable: stretches of interactivity may
bring forth affordances that were hitherto unnoticed. Such small
changes in the layout of affordances may, even on timescales as
short as those investigated in this article, create a large-scale
restructuring of the layout of affordances that in turn bring about
observable changes in behaviour. Third, the thick relation also gives
space for sense-saturation to play out in interactivity. Thus, as
summarised by Casasanto and Dijkstra (2010), there is “a growing
body of evidence that links bodily action with meaning, memory,
and emotion.” Without delving into the details of this work, it al-
lows us to hypothesise that emotional and autobiographical dy-
namics cause affordance, qua thick relations, to change on a
relatively short timescale e not unlike how an optometrist can
make light refract in different ways by twisting and turning a prism.
Both cases discussed in this paper illustrate how emotional,
sense-saturated interactivity affects the layout of affordances and
thus behaviour. In agent-environment systems, frustration and
similar emotions are an order parameter that indicates the insta-
bility of the layout of affordances: the more frustration (or
“emotional energy”) there is in the system, the more unstable is the
layout of affordances, and the more sensitive is it to small-scale
perturbations that may cascade into observable changes in the
layout of affordances, and thus in behaviour. Frustration thus
functions as an impetus for the agents to keep trying and keep
acting, rather than to sink into apathy. Interestingly, the frustration
can be traced to different sources: Black and White's frustration
increases as their problem keeps preventing them from carrying
out their duties. In contrast, Billy's problem is trivial. His frustration
can be traced to a much slower trajectory: his decision to go for a
military career. As Cowley and Nash (2013:196) observe, Billy
“places himself in history; he acts as a Royal Air Force cadet, uses
artifacts and institutions e and, in so doing, lives these roles and
relationships.” In a similar study, Steffensen et al. (submitted) show
how a participant in a lab experiment uses aesthetic inclinations to
twist and turn the thick relation, so as to change the layout of
affordances on a short timescale.
In conclusion, while emotions have not been a matter of high
concern for ecological psychologists, they seem to function as an
impetus for performing unplanned and unmethodical changes that
reveal unnoticed affordances for reaching a solution: cognitive
agents in the wild engage less in problem-solving, and more in
solution-probing.
6. Discussion
This article has aimed to show the potential of cognitive pro-
batonics. It has argued that self-organising cognitive systems are
functional systems that achieve results through interactivity, i.e.
microscale actioneperception cycles between agents and affor-
dances in their environment. Following this line of thought, it has
argued for the potential of scrutinising particulars on a very ﬁne-
grained level, using the method of Cognitive Event Analysis
(CEA). It has thus prioritised a qualitative, idiographic research
strategy that, in line with the probatonic principle, complements
quantitative research methods.
To complement the picture, we must also consider how lan-
guage contributes to the functioning of cognitive systems. Crucially,
the examples presented here undermine the idea that language
primarily functions as a means for externalising and exchanging
thoughts. Rather, the examples above have shown that the verbal
aspects of Black's and Billy's utterances become signiﬁcant when
they mesh with other bodily dynamics on a ﬁne-grained timescale.
Unlike models that endow language with a privileged status vis-
a-vis cognition, as if language was a golden path to understand the
innermachinery of themind, cognitive probatonics rejects the view
that language is a separate modality (or module) for meaning-
making. Rather, language depends on the whole-bodied mesh-
work of manual, gestural, and vocal activity e or interactivity,
rather, as behaviour depends on the capacity of agent-environment
systems. As illustrated in Black's drop-catch-throw movement on
the stressed syllable mig (['mai], me) and in Billy's pointing-
sweeping hand movement on pongo come back, timing is the key
to understanding the cognitive trajectory: it is the real-time, self-
organised interlocking of parts that make a multi-faceted cognitive
system function. Language partakes in this interlocking by
providing an economic way of establishing and stabilising per-
spectives and hypotheses. For instance, verbal if-then conditionals
allowed Billy to keep track of multiple possibilities by transforming
them into a series of sequential hypotheses (cf. Fig. 6), and the
counterfactual if it were me-narrative allowed Black to reframe the
problem in ways that would be extremely cumbersome or costly
without the resource of linguistic patterns. Such patterns suggest
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that coordination in cognitive systems become sense-saturated as
they integrate non-local resources (Steffensen, 2015; Steffensen &
Cowley, 2010). Theoretically, this is what motivates the concept of
interactivity, deﬁned as sense-saturated coordination: human
cognition takes place neither in a disembodiedmental realm, nor in
a purely situated ﬂow of ﬂesh.
I ﬁnalise this discussion by addressing a concern that was
brought up in the review process, namely regarding the status of
qualitative methods: is there a place for cognitive probatonics in
cognitive science? Or should the approach be rejected because it
equips the researcher with vast freedom to interpret at will? To
exemplify, one may argue that the analysis above falls prey to the
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy: indeed Black's becoming the in-
voice receiver occurred, and indeed their coming up with a solution
occurred, but there is no way to prove that Black's change in
perspective is what led to the solution.
This objection can be met in two ways: ﬁrst, while one may
follow a Popperian line and argue that “non-reproducible single
occurrences are of no signiﬁcance to science” (Popper, 2002:66), it
is worthwhile pointing out that none of the causal relations that
have been experimentally identiﬁed comes on its own “in real life,”
but always in a noisy environment, intertwined with a good deal of
other causal and non-causal relations. One cannot a priori eschew
the study of such complexes, even if the price is lack of certainty:
other criteria than reproducibility may be possible and relevant in
science.
Second, practitioners of qualitative studies could accept a Dual
Compatibility Test (DCT): the ﬁrst part of the DCT dictates that an
interpretation must be internally compatible with all observable
facts about the cognitive system under scrutiny. The second part of
the DCT evaluates a qualitative analysis of cognitive probatonics by
measuring it against the knowledge about cognition that the sci-
entiﬁc community has accumulated.6 Thus, if a qualitative inter-
pretation is compatible with the best of our knowledge of
cognition, then it is sufﬁciently constrained to be plausible. It may
not be the only plausible interpretation, but such under-
determination is also the case in quantitative work. Interestingly,
the same DIT applies to quantitative methods. For instance, Bert
Hodges' reanalysis of the Asch experiment (Hodges, 2007; Hodges
& Geyer, 2006) relies on the same data as Asch and followers did
when they interpreted the experiment. But Hodges' interpretation
of these results is more compatible with the full dataset, and not
just the subset that causedmost social psychologists to assume that
conformist behaviour is widespread in social groups.
While the traditional battlefront in psychology has been deﬁned
by the disagreements between direct and indirect realists, and be-
tween mentalists and ecologists, the parties have been surprisingly
eye to eyewhen it comes to the choice ofweapon to use at the front:
experimental designs, statistics and (to some extent) dynamical
modelling. In such a situation, one easily forgets that there are other
voices that present new ideas in psychology that may contribute to
our understanding of the complexities of human behaviour and
cognition. Cognitive probatonics is one such voice. By building on
ecological models of cognition, it attempts to establish a descriptive
and, in time, explanatory frame for capturing the real-life dynamics
of human behaviour on a ﬁne-grained timescale. It makes no claim
to replace nomothetically inclined approaches, butmoremodestly it
suggests that it complements these approaches by providing a
method for studying the messy, real-life manifestation of cognition
and behaviour. Timewill show if thismodesty is reciprocated by the
theoretical superpowers in cognitive science.
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